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THE CUBAN CRISIS

The period of emergency operations as a result of the Cuban crisis extended from 20 October until 27 November in the Alaskan Air Command. Some initial actions were taken in support of emergency operations prior to the declaration of the increased readiness posture on 22 October. The AAC responded to the emergency in accordance with previously prepared plans and experienced no appreciable difficulty in carrying out its mission.

This command had, understandably, been conditioned to the expectation that the threat to national security would come from the north. Constant surveillance was maintained so that early warning could be given of any attack from this geographical area. Of special significance during the period of the Cuban crisis was that there was no indication of increased Russian activity in this vicinity and there were no unusual occurrences from the air defense point of view.¹

A warning message of the impending emergency came from the JCS to CINCAL and then to the AAC on 21 October. The increased readiness posture was established on 22

* From: History of the Alaskan
Air Command, July-Dec 1962

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October when AAC received DEFCON 3 from two sources: CINCAL and CINCNORAD. The Commander AAC (COMAAC) declared DEFCON 3 at 2300Z on 22 October. The AAC command post and the Elmendorf AFB command post were activated within the next half-hour. Manning of emergency positions to include the alternate command post at Wildwood Station and the forward dispersal bases (King Salmon, Galena, and Eielson) was accomplished in accordance with the previously prepared AAC Emergency Capabilities Plan (AAOECAP). After the initial actions were taken and the positions established, there were no significant changes from day to day.²

On 20 October the CINCAL had received messages advising of the worsening Cuban situation. At Eielson AFB the 4147th Combat Support Wing (SAC) increased the Chroma Dome mission from indoctrination level to 1/3 modified posture. Increased support readiness was required of AAC support forces concurrent with notification from SAC. The Eielson AFB Commander directed immediate shift schedule posture of 12 hours on/12 hours off for all base petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), field maintenance, and supply activities. The AAC POL Officer was called by the Eielson maintenance

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and supply group commander to compute increased JP-4 requirements for Chrome Dome efforts. Concurrent action was required to insure that increased POL requirements were immediately programmed for delivery to Eielson via tanker and Haines/Fairbanks pipeline. The requirement for daily reporting of Eielson POL inventory was established to insure uninterrupted delivery of fuels commensurate with tankage capacities and consumption experienced.

On 21 October the CINCAL continued to receive messages from the JCS advising him of the Cuban situation and describing the initial naval quarantine of Cuba. The CINCAL advised the COMAAC of receipt of these messages and the Alaskan Air Command was anticipating the DEFCON change that occurred the following day.

The Alaskan NORAD Region was on DEFCON 5 "Alpha" on 21 October. Defense forces for the region were the F-102A interceptor and the Nike-Hercules missiles. The primary maintenance and support base for the F-102A was Elmendorf AFB with forward deployments at Eielson AFB, Galena Airport, and King Salmon Airport. The Nike-Hercules missile force of two battalions was located in the Fairbanks-Eielson AFB and Anchorage-Elmendorf

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AFB areas.³

On 22 October at 1740Z CINCNORAD declared DEFCON 5 "Delta". At 1750Z, AAC was advised of this declaration which directed a change in air defense weapons posture for the Alaskan NORAD/CONAD Region forces. No immediate command action or support, however, was required at that time.

At 1955Z CINCONAD implemented MINICOM. During alerts, the tactical communications network serving NORAD could become severely congested due to increased traffic load or loss of facilities. To insure NORAD of an operationally efficient tactical communications system for this period of congestion, it was necessary to reduce certain message and telephone traffic. The Alaskan Communications Region (ACR) was directed to impose communications restrictions required for MINICOM since the command tactical communication system served NORAD forces in Alaska.⁴ Although MINICOM was enforced, the minimized use of communications facilities did not hamper preparations during the emergency.⁵

At 2300Z CINCONAD declared DEFCON 3 "Delta" and the AAC command post passed the message to staff agencies of this command. Contingent upon declaration

of DEFCON 3 all forces assigned to the Alaskan CONAD Region assumed a readiness posture above that of normal readiness. The Alaskan NORAD Region (ANR) implemented Air Defense Plan-Alaska. This required maximum manning for all functions within the region, primary battle staff recall, and deployment of one-third of combat center personnel, including battle staff, to the Region's alternate combat center.⁶

Immediately upon learning of declaration of DEFCON 3 "Delta", AAC staff sections established support to the AAC command post on a 24-hour manning basis. Personnel were informed of this condition and placed on a 15-minute alert status.

The requirement for greatly compressed reaction times within Alaska during periods of national emergency, declaration of war, or imminence of attack, necessitated the development of a network of command posts designed to operate as vital links in the chain of command from the AAC Commander to unit command levels. This network had to provide continuous command and control and surveillance of essential air and support operations. The system had also to provide a location from which the commander could exercise command and control of

assigned forces and weapons. The AAC command post was the facility organized and equipped to provide the commander and his staff a focal point from which they might perform their component functions during peacetime and war or other emergencies.

At the call of the commander or during emergency conditions certain essential staff members had to be assembled so that the commander might have immediate access to his staff and so that the staff might be afforded the capability of instantaneous coordination and interaction. The command post provided the facility from which those requirements might be met. When functions were performed from the command post facility, a change of command staff relationship occurred. The Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) for Plans became the chief of the support staff. When assembled, the staff consisted of representatives from the following: DCS/Plans; DCS/Operations; DCS/Civil Engineering; DCS/Personnel; DCS/Material; Command Surgeon; Staff Communications; Directorate of Security and Law Enforcement; ACS/Intelligence and Disaster Control.

When the command post staff were fully assembled, all activities were aligned toward maintaining the

facilities in readiness for accelerated operations contingent upon the declaration of war or imminence of attack. Emergency war plans were reviewed to insure the necessary degree of preparedness. Emphasis was placed on those elements which were in direct support of the air defense mission.

Upon implementation of DEFCON 3, the support flying units were notified to deploy the advance cadre to the alternate command posts, base recovery posts, and Safe Haven. Flight crews were placed on alert and all staff visits via airlift were cancelled. At 2316Z the Alaskan NORAD Region was fully manned and deployment of interceptor forces to forward bases was effected.

At 2345Z the Commander AAC directed deployment to the alternate headquarters, Wildwood Army Station, Alaska. Selected personnel of the command post secretariat and headquarters staff were deployed immediately. The DCS/Plans, who had assumed the position of chief of the command post, deployed two officers to man the position of chief of the command post at the alternate headquarters.⁷

No difficulties were experienced in transporting

personnel and supplies to the forward bases and the normal operations in support of remote sites continued. The extended period of the emergency operation, however, requiring man-hour expenditures greatly in excess of the normal work levels, taxed organizations and individuals. Despite this, morale remained high.

The increased forward deployment of aircraft to dispersal bases resulted in a reduced flying program and curtailment of training although the crews remained on duty in excess of 100 hours a week. Aircraft deployment was in accordance with AAC Emergency Capabilities Plan (AACECAP) directions. On 22 October eight aircraft were deployed to each of the three forward bases while the remainder of AAC's 40 F-102As were at Elmendorf AFB. On 3 November when NORAD directed the command to go to DEFCON 3 "Bravo", AAC reduced the alert aircraft at each forward base by four.

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The increased alert brought about direct expenditures of approximately \$26,000 over that visualized in the current budget. This, however, was considerably

below the estimated additive requirements by this command at the beginning of the emergency.⁹ Increased funds were required for such items as personnel overtime, travel, fuel, additional support of SAC, and preparations for evacuation of personnel and supplies.

As a result of the alert the command discovered certain weaknesses in planning which were corrected. The survival plan was revised as the former plan did not furnish enough details and provide enough coordination with civil authorities to be of sufficient use. An obvious increase in interest was displayed by civil defense authorities and closer coordination between military and civil defense planning was achieved. Safe Havens having been designated, detailed plans for transportation of both the military and civilian population were refined.¹⁰

On 23 October at 2135Z CINCONAD declared DEFCON 3 "Charley" which directed a change in air defense weapons posture for the Alaskan CONAD Region. This lowered the alert requirements for the AHR combat forces to enable sustained operations under DEFCON 3. AAC forces, however, remained on the defense readiness posture established on 22 October. For the duration of

the crisis normal daily business was conducted from the command posts while maintaining the increased alert posture.

At 1632Z on 3 November CINCHORAD declared DEFCON 3 "Bravo". This further reduced alert requirements for the ANR combat forces.

At 2355Z on 27 November CINCHORAD declared DEFCON 5 "Alpha" and the ANR returned to normal alert posture. Command personnel and subordinate units were informed of return to normal status.¹¹

The following status charts show the combat forces structure under various defense conditions in effect during the Cuban crisis.¹²

21 October 1962

The Alaska NORAD Region was on DEFCON 5 "Alpha". Defense forces for the region are the F-102A Interceptor and the Nike-Hercules missiles. The primary maintenance and support base for the F-102A is Elmendorf AFB with forward deployments at Eielson AFB, Galena Airport, and King Salmon Airport. The Nike-Hercules missile force of two battalions located in the Fairbanks-Eielson AFB and Anchorage-Elmendorf AFB areas.

Status (DEFCON 5 "Alpha")

F-102 Interceptor

Possessed - 41

Operationally Ready - 33

Primary Weapon - GAR-11

Secondary Weapons - GAR-1D-2A

<u>Location</u>	<u>5 Min</u>	<u>15 Min</u>	<u>1 Hour</u>
Elmendorf AFB	2	6	18
Elelson AFB	2		
King Salmon	2		
Galena	2		1

Nike

Batteries - 9

Operationally Ready - 9

Weapons - Hercules

<u>Location</u>	<u>15 Min</u>	<u>30 Min</u>	<u>3 Hour</u>
Fairbanks	1	2	2
Anchorage	1	2	1

22 October 1962

Status (DEFCON 5 "Delta") 22/2015Z

F-102 Interceptor

Possessed - 41

Operationally Ready - 32

<u>Location</u>	<u>5 Min</u>	<u>15 Min</u>	<u>1 Hour</u>
Elmendorf AFB	25	0	0
Elelson AFB	2	0	0
King Salmon	2	0	0

<u>Location</u>	<u>5 Min</u>	<u>15 Min</u>	<u>1 Hour</u>
Galena	2	1	0

Nike-Hercules

<u>Location</u>	<u>Battle Stations</u>
Fairbanks	5
Anchorage	4

Status (DEFCON 3 "Delta") 22/2300Z

F-102 Interceptor

Possessed - 41

Operationally Ready 33

<u>Location</u>	<u>5 Min</u>	<u>15 Min</u>	<u>1 Hour</u>
Elmendorf AFB	10	0	1
Elson AFB	2	2	0
King Salmon	2	0	0
Galena	2	2	0

NOTE: 3 F-102 enroute Elson

6 F-102 enroute Galena

Nike-Hercules

<u>Location</u>	<u>Battle Stations</u>
Fairbanks	5
Anchorage	4

23 October 1962

Status (DEFCON 3 "Charley") 2135Z

F-102 Interceptor

Possessed - 41

Operationally Ready - 38

<u>Location</u>	<u>5 Min</u>	<u>15 Min</u>	<u>1 Hour</u>
Elmendorf AFB	2	6	3
Etelson AFB	2	2	4
King Salmon	2	2	4
Galena	2	2	4

Nike-Hercules

<u>Location</u>	<u>Battle Station</u>	<u>30 Min</u>	<u>1 Hour</u>
Fairbanks	3	2	0
Anchorage	2	2	0

3 November 1962

Status (DEFCON 3 "Bravo") 1649Z

F-102 Interceptors

Possessed - 40

Operationally Ready - 33

<u>Location</u>	<u>5 Min</u>	<u>15 Min</u>	<u>1 Hour</u>
Elmendorf AFB	2		13
Etelson AFB	2	2	2
King Salmon	2	2	2
Galena	2	2	2

Nike-Hercules

<u>Location</u>	<u>15 Min</u>	<u>30 Min</u>	<u>1 Hour</u>
Fairbanks	2	2	1
Anchorage	2	1	1

Intelligence

No significant actions in response to the Cuban crisis were taken in the Alaskan Air Command prior to 20 October 1962. However, from 31 July until the President's public announcement that the Soviet Union had introduced strategic offensive weapons into Cuba and his demand that they be withdrawn, this command was receiving intelligence information on the Cuban issue. This was adequate to allow an estimate to be made that the military build-up in Cuba was such that it constituted a growing threat to the national security of the United States.

The following were major items of intelligence received prior to the President's public announcement: (1) the fact that there had been and was a tremendous increase in Bloc and non-Bloc shipping to Cuba, and that some of this shipping was known to have carried military cargo; (2) confirmation that thousands of Soviet military and technical personnel had arrived in Cuba; and (3) identification of a modern and highly sophisticated air and coastal defense system in Cuba.¹³

At 2310Z on 22 October ACS/Intelligence began a round-the-clock battle team intelligence warning in the

Alaskan NORAD Region combat center (ANRCC) and at the AAC command post. Contact was established with intelligence at NORAD and ALCOM. At 2345Z battle station intelligence teams (BSIT) at four Alaskan launch/recovery bases were manned and communications established between them and the ANRCC.

The following actions were taken to maintain the initiated increased intelligence watch:

1. Close intelligence liaison was maintained with ALCOM J-2 and NORAD intelligence and with subordinate BSITs.
 2. Schedules were drawn up to insure 24-hour manning. At the same time procedures were established to insure that routine intelligence functions would be accomplished for the duration of the emergency. To insure control, procedures were drawn up to insure that the whereabouts of all members of the ACS/Intelligence staff agency was known at all times.
 3. The ACS/Intelligence kept the Commander AAC informed on all significant intelligence as it was received.
 4. The intelligence battle team briefed the AAC staff in the command post four times daily. The ANRCC
- ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

Battle commander and his staff were also kept fully informed while at their positions in the battle staff cage of the ANRCC. In addition, current intelligence situation maps were maintained in the AAC command post.

5. At the alternate ANRCC and alternate command post intelligence briefings were presented daily.

Every effort was made to insure that all significant intelligence received at the primary ANRCC and primary command post was passed to the alternates.

6. At the AAC warning center, the watch was doubled and briefings were presented as required.

Throughout the DEFCON 3 state of alert, ACS/Intelligence submitted the ALCON periodical intelligence report and prepared the intelligence portion of the AAC Commander's situation report to the CINCAL on a daily basis. Also, daily intelligence summaries were prepared and sent to subordinate units.

Although the reduction in forces status from DEFCON 3 "Delta" to DEFCON 3 "Bravo", on 5 November, allowed certain adjustments to be made in manning requirements, the increased intelligence watch posture that was initially attained on 22 October was maintained. All intelligence reporting was continued, briefings were

presented, and intelligence positions were manned both at the primary and alternate ANRCC and command posts. However, intelligence manning was reduced at Wildwood Station, eventually to a force of two, and the AAC command post intelligence briefings schedule was changed from four briefings per day to two briefings per day.¹⁴

Personnel

Upon declaration of the alert status and in the days immediately following, command personnel were briefed concerning the alert and reminded that they were subject for duty within fifteen minutes upon call. Staff visits and scheduled inspections were cancelled for the duration of the crisis. Full manning of the AAC command post and the alternate command post was achieved. DCS/Personnel screened records to determine those persons that were combat essential, combat support, and combat reserve. The USAF Hospital reported by name, rank, and organization the patients screened for release and return to duty in accordance with current directives. Training courses were suspended for the duration of the crisis. A subsequent message from Headquarters USAF gave authorization to withdraw personnel that were TDY

to schools when those individuals possessed skills of vital necessity to meet readiness conditions.

Personnel leaves and passes, except emergency, were cancelled; this was later amended to allow commanders to grant leaves and passes but they were to insure that readiness conditions were maintained. Personnel with dependents in the area were advised to obtain needed survival items and store them in emergency shelters.

Controls were directed by security personnel to insure that only base personnel and key civilians who had military reason and need were allowed on the military installation. Base access control points were augmented with additional guards and personnel assigned to the base were required to produce their identification credentials before authorizing them access to the base. Civilian personnel requiring base access for required meetings were only authorized admittance when the Air Police received prior notification from the sponsoring military staff agency or unit. More stringent controls were established within base restricted areas. Personnel access lists and restricted area badges were used to insure that only personnel who had the right and need

were authorized access to base critical areas.

On the first day of the alert, 22 materiel personnel at Eielson AFB were provided to insure increased security forces for protection of Chrome Dome aircraft. Ten air police were moved by military air from AAC installations to King Salmon to provide security for additional F-102 aircraft which were deployed to King Salmon Airport.

On 25 October the alternate command post manning was reduced from full manning to advance cadre only. The primary command post procedure was revised, also, to conserve manpower. Instead of requiring a representative from each staff agency to be present at all times, only operations, intelligence and chief of staff (DCS/Plans) positions were manned on a 24-hour basis. Other command post agencies maintained their personnel on alert for immediate return to the command post and were required to be present for briefing and staff reports at 1000, 1400, 1700, and 2100 hours daily.

On 5 November, lack of activity in command posts indicated that a further reduction in manning could be accepted provided full manning could be achieved in minimum time. Consequently, two staff reporting periods

at primary command post were eliminated and full-time presence in the command post was required only for the chief of staff position (DCS/Plans). During non-duty hours this position was covered by a command post duty officer. Further reduction in manning of the alternate command post was accomplished by returning all but the minimum advance cadre to Elmendorf AFB.¹⁵

At 2200Z on 6 November the Commander ANR reduced the combat center and alternate combat center required manning by one-third. Personnel in both facilities had averaged on 84-hour week since the initiation of DEFCON 3.¹⁶

Remote sites reported that their radar operations went on a 2-shift (12 hours per shift) schedule on 22 October. This schedule continued until the 27th of November when AAC again assumed a DEFCON 5 status. In some instances the operations personnel were required to work a 60-manhour week due to requirements of AACR 55-23 and being below Unit Manning Document (UMD) requirements with no replacements. The squadrons felt, generally, that despite some strain having been put on all sections during the Cuban crisis, personnel responded well and did a good job.¹⁷

The increased forward deployment of aircraft to dispersal bases resulted in a reduced flying program and curtailment of training although the crews remained on duty in excess of 100 hours a week. Despite this, morale was high and the aircraft maintenance rate remained at an acceptably high level.¹⁸

Budget

Headquarters USAF, on 24 October, directed the air commands to report on financing and additive requirements in connection with the Cuban crisis. Weekly reports of estimated additive requirements through 31 December 1962 were to be submitted to Headquarters USAF. Instructions were issued by this headquarters to subordinate units regarding the reports. It was stated that Headquarters USAF had directed that periodic reports of actual commitments and obligations incurred pursuant to the Cuban situation would be made. The reports would be by appropriation and budget program activity within appropriations and would cover only the costs over and above normal operations which could be directly attributed to the Cuban situation.¹⁹ Such items as personnel overtime, travel and transportation, contractual services, subsistence, equipment, POL and

other supplies were to be considered in the reports.²⁰

The first weekly report on 2 November contained estimated additive requirements in the amount of \$286,000. The second report submitted on 9 November reduced the requirements from \$286,000 to \$135,000. The weekly change report of anticipated additive requirements dated 3 December showed a total of \$26,306 which was also the figure shown on the final report of 8 December.²¹ Not included was the estimated requirement of \$34,000 which was to be allocated for equipment and supplies for setting up a field hospital. This was omitted because of the interpretation by the comptroller that previously known requirements, regardless of how essential in the light of recent events, were not "additive" requirements as defined in the guidance received from Headquarters USAF.²²

Materiel

Increased materiel support of AAC units as well as tenants was required during the period of emergency. As one of the first indications of stepped up activity, the AAC command POL officer was called, on 20 October, to compute increased JP-4 requirements for Chrome Dome (SAC) efforts at Hielson AFB. Concurrent action was

required to insure that increased POL requirements were immediately programmed for delivery to Eielson via tanker and Haines/Fairbanks pipeline. The requirement for daily reporting of Eielson POL inventory was established to insure uninterrupted delivery of fuels commensurate with tankage capacities and consumption experienced.

On 22 October it was determined that additional Chrome Dome JP-4 fuel tanker deliveries to Haines would be required at the rate of one full tanker every seven days. Action was taken to increase POL slates accordingly.

Upon declaration of the emergency, staff sections in the command took action in accordance with the previously prepared AAC Emergency Capabilities Plan (AAECAP). For the DCS/Materiel this included deploying support personnel, ground support equipment, and emergency fly-away spares for F-102 aircraft to the forward operating bases. Initial action was taken on 22 October and on 24 October confirmation was received that F-102 War Readiness Materiel (WRM) spares had been received at all forward operating bases.

The emergency pointed up the continuing and

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increased requirement for large amounts of WRM, particularly in the medical field. Although WRM had been authorized, lack of funds had precluded the purchase.²⁴

Throughout the emergency period, continued emphasis was placed on insuring that all support personnel, supplies, and equipment were maintained in the highest state of readiness. Daily operational rechecks were made to insure that the ready position was attained and maintained and that all support plans reflected accurate details.

On 21 November, Middletown Air Materiel Area (MAAMA) officially informed AAQ that SAC Chrome Dome posture had reverted from 1/8th modified posture to indoctrination level. This data cancelled requirements for daily POL inventory reporting and prompted immediate cancellation of increased POL slates and return to normal POL slating and deliveries. From 22 through 26 of November, however, increased readiness was maintained in most materiel areas.²⁵

On 27 November, when DEFCON 5 was declared, subordinate units were informed of the return to normal status; however, as a result of the Cuban situation,

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revised support plans providing fully integrated, quicker response and better effectiveness were developed. Continued emphasis was to be placed upon constant refinement of concepts to better enhance this command's capability in supporting USAF war plans.²⁶

Dispersal and Survival Plans

During the emergency, close coordination between military and civil defense planning was achieved. Survival plans were revised and positive action was taken by military commanders to keep personnel informed and dispel rumors. This headquarters, however, felt that the decision for dispersal of dependents to Safe Havens should be made at the highest level (JCS) following a determination of the effect such dispersal might have on the civilian population.²⁷

On 22 October, upon declaration of DEFCON 3, personnel were deployed to their alternate posts in accordance with AACECAP directions to provide 24-hour coverage. The support flying units were notified to deploy the advance cadre to their emergency positions. The same day AAC planners met with ALCON, 5040th Air Base Wing, U.S. Army (USARAL), and Anchorage Civil Defense Officials to determine the actions required

should the decision be made to order evacuation of the Anchorage area.²⁸

The Safe Haven area designated by the Air Force for this vicinity was Seward and the Army had selected Whittier as the Safe Haven for noncombatants.²⁹

The subject of transportation to those areas considered at length throughout the emergency period in an effort to resolve problems connected with moving both the military and civilian populace in the event conditions warranted it.

On 23 October AAC and USARAL personnel met with Alaska Railroad (ARR) officials. The conference was required to consolidate current military planned requirements for rail movement in the event emergency conditions worsened. The ARR was particularly concerned about the combined military/civil requirements and capability to meet anticipated commitments in the event dispersal was ordered. This situation was prompted in part by the Alaskan Governor and State Civil Defense inquiries into ARR-planned support of evacuation of the civilian population. As a result of this initial gathering, it was determined that further AAC meetings and coordination with other agencies were required to insure

that the finalized total requirement was identified and presented to USARAL which was designated as action/control agency over rail transport requests.³⁰

Representatives of AAC, USARAL, AHR, and various local medical and civil defense organizations attended subsequent meetings to review dispersal plans and discuss problem areas. One of the priority items was to project rail car transport requirements for hospital, base recovery post, and noncombatant dispersal to the pre-selected areas. Upon termination of a 25 October meeting, total rail car requirements were transmitted to USARAL Transportation.

Of special concern was the immediate assembly, checkout, and movement arrangements of the 17-car hospital train for patient evacuation to the Elmendorf Safe Haven area. On 24 October the command surgeon had called an urgent meeting of AAC, USARAL, and AHR representatives to explore the situation. At a meeting the following day, also attended by civilian hospital personnel and the civil defense director, general discussion was held with regard to utilization of the train and box cars for transportation of patients, hospital personnel, medical supplies, and equipment

from the Anchorage area to the Safe Haven area in Seward. Transportation personnel advised that two hours would be required for engine hook-up to the hospital train. Four additional hours would be required to load patients, staff, medical supplies, and equipment. Five more hours would be needed to move to Seward. Also discussed were the problems of protection from the elements, medical staff required, and alternate modes of transportation in case the rail and road beds were destroyed. There was some discussion, too, of an alternate Safe Haven.

On 25 October AAC received USARAL/ARR confirmation that the engine hook-up to the hospital train had been accomplished and checkout of operationally ready condition was completed. The train was repositioned in the requested holding area and ready for loading. It was noted that there were no heat, sanitation, water, or feeding facilities available. The USAF Hospital had already taken necessary action to procure heaters for use in each sleeper unit of the hospital train. The heating system in all cars was inoperable and the ARR officials estimated that cost of repairs would amount to \$2,600 per car.

The command surgeon also requested immediate POL support for two emergency first aid stations to be set up along the southern dispersal route from Elmendorf. Diesel fuel was required to provide heat to the field units. On 25 October, two fully loaded 600-gallon fuel trailers with tractors were delivered to the base hospital for movement when first aid stations were to be activated.³¹

On 25 October the 5010th Air Base Wing at Eielson requested assistance in obtaining certain RCA buildings located at Fort Greely to support noncombatant dispersal to that area. The request was prompted in support of changing existing dispersal plans to permit the location of a recovery center farther from the Eielson fall-out pattern. This headquarters requested RCA to release the facilities for AAC use. The same day the buildings were released and Eielson was notified to commence assembly of supplies and equipment for transport to Fort Greely. Instructions included the purchase authority for critical essentials.³²

On 26 October USARAL and AAC discussed the AAC requirement for rail support of dispersal plans. This headquarters stated that the total minimum requirement

of 108 units was established as 4 PQL tank cars; 7 flatcars for equipment; and 97 box cars for supplies, equipment, and personnel. USARAL advised that ARI was unable to meet the full requirements of both military and civil plans and that a pro rata share would be made available to each agency. On the 29th of October ARR commenced positioning of 61 rail units for AAC use in connection with dispersal/evacuation efforts. This consisted of 40 boxcars for personnel, 20 bulk cement cars for cargo, and one heated car for sensitive medical supplies. The ARR notified this headquarters that pre-positioning of the evacuation train was completed on 30 October.⁵³

Another meeting in the Medical Safe Haven planning was held 1 November. Included were representatives from local civilian hospitals, Civil Defense, Anchorage, USAF Hospital Elmendorf, U.S. Army Dispensary Fort Richardson, ALCON Surgeon, and AAC representatives. It was believed that considerable progress was made toward accomplishing written emergency patient evacuation plans for each of the local civilian hospitals. The meeting produced considerable stimulation and interest toward accomplishment of civil defense planning

in utilization of local civilian physicians and paramedical personnel.³⁴

On 8 November the command surgeon authorized the USAF Hospitals to procure necessary tentage and food service equipment and supplies to attain field operational medical capability. The hospitals were to utilize available P-478 O&M funds for this purpose.³⁵

Travel to the Safe Haven area by road was also considered. The plans called for 15 truck-trailer units to be used on two round trips to the Safe Haven site. When the single road to the end destination and the climatic conditions affecting the single road were considered, it became obvious that an alternate plan for evacuation must be developed and implemented to insure completion and survival under any anticipated condition. Initial planning was underway by 24 October.

As planning progressed for survival/dispersal conditions it was apparent that other existing plans needed to be changed. Revision of the dispersal plans to relocate the Elmendorf/AAC base recovery post was accomplished. Reevaluation of the existing plan indicated the need to reposition the post further from the Elmendorf blast/fall-out area and expand total efforts

to provide complete recovery and operational ability. By 29 October the initial revised concept for the base recovery post was completed. A detailed list of the total personnel to be deployed, together with equipment, supplies, food, POL, shelters, transport, and the like, had been developed. Simultaneously with the development of the revised concept, DCS/Materiel took initial action to locate, mark, and assemble additional items for forward movement. Continued emphasis was placed on insuring that all support personnel, supplies, and equipment were maintained in the highest state of readiness throughout the remainder of the emergency period.³⁶

Meetings were held on 14 and 16 November to discuss a revised concept of emergency operations for this command. This concept envisioned two forces for operating bases - - the Reconstitution Operations Force (ROF) and the Wartime Operating Force (WOF). All staff agencies were requested to furnish information regarding the number of people and the amount of equipment and supplies to deploy or to remain on Elmendorf AFB in support of the WOF/ROF concept of emergency operations.

CHAPTER IX - THE CUBAN CRISIS

1. Interview with Col A. V. Walton, AAC Deputy Commander, 4 Dec 62; Msg, ALIF 57, AAC to USAF, 6 Dec 62, Doc. 152. (SECRET)
2. Msg, ALIF 57, AAC to USAF, 6 Dec 62, Doc. 152. (SECRET)
3. Chronology of the Cuban Crisis, 31 Jul - 27 Nov 62, (Hereinafter cited as Chronology), Doc. 153. (SECRET)
4. Ibid.
5. Msg, ALIF 57, AAC to USAF, 6 Dec 62, Doc. 152. (SECRET)
6. Chronology.
7. Ibid.
8. Msg, ALIF 57, AAC to USAF, 6 Dec 62, Doc. 152. (SECRET)
9. Chronology.
10. Msg, ALIF 57, AAC to USAF, 6 Dec 62, Doc. 152. (SECRET)
11. Chronology.
12. ANR Combat Center Special Hist Rpt, 22 Oct - 28 Nov 62, in AAC Hist Div files. (SECRET) ✓
13. Chronology.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. ACW Squadron Reports, Oct-Dec 62, in AAC Hist Div files.

18. Msg, ALIF 57, AAC to USAF, 6 Dec 62, Doc. 152.
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29. Memo for the Record, AAC Command Surgeon, subj: Medical Responsibility for Elmendorf AFB Following Dispersal, 5 Nov 62, Doc. 164.

30. Chronology.

31. Ibid.

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33. Ibid.

34. Memo, AAC Command Surgeon, subj: Medical Responsibility for Elmendorf AFB Following Dispersal, 5 Nov 62, Doc. 164.

35. Memo, AAC Command Surgeon to USAF Hosp Elmendorf and 5010 USAF Hosp, subj: Medical Service Pre-positioning Objectives, 8 Nov 62, Doc. 165.

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